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ABSTRACT
The annualized interest rate charged on payday loans can reach 1,950 percent, whereas similar rates charged
by banks are typically less than 25 percent. Also, persons borrowing from payday lenders and paying the higher
interest rates are disproportionately lower-income Blacks. This provides an incentive for Blacks seeking loans
to turn to banks rather than payday lenders. This may be more likely to happen when there are Black-owned
banks in communities with greater percentages of Blacks. Indeed, offices of such banks may substitute for
payday loan stores, providing a greater opportunity for Blacks to avoid the higher interest rates associated with
payday lenders. We hypothesize that to the extent Black-owned banks substitute for payday there is a greater
opportunity for lower-income Blacks to substitute/switch firms and thereby seek lower-cost loans. We do find
that there are significantly fewer payday loan stores in counties where there are more Black bank offices.
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INTRODUCTION
Banks and payday lenders are well-known categories of financial firms that provide loans to their
customers. Both types of firms, moreover, charge interest on the loans they provide to borrowers. But
the similarity between these two institutional types effectively ends there because the interest rates
charged differ widely. Indeed, the annualized rates charged on payday loans can reach 1,950 percent
(Barth et al., 2016), whereas similar rates charged by banks are typically less than 25 percent.
The higher interest rates per se that are charged by payday lenders are controversial. So high that
several states and the District of Columbia have prohibited payday lenders from even opening stores
within their borders (Barth et al., 2016). Adding to the controversy is the fact that persons borrowing
money from payday lenders and paying much higher interest rates are disproportionately lowerincome Blacks. Indeed, important research by Stegman (2007) finds that lower-income Blacks are
more than twice as likely than whites to have taken out a payday loan.
The fact that persons borrowing money from payday lenders and paying higher interest rates are
disproportionately lower-income Blacks provides an incentive for Blacks seeking loans to turn to banks
rather than payday lenders. This may be more likely to happen when there are Black-owned banks per
se located in communities that have higher percentages of Black residents. Indeed, where there are
offices of such banks, Blacks may switch from payday loan stores to offices of Black-owned banks,
thereby obtaining a greater opportunity to reduce, if not avoid, the higher interest rate charges
associated with payday lenders. Based on the previous literature, we believe we are the first to
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hypothesize that to the extent Black-owned banks and payday lenders both have offices or stores in
the same counties, there is a greater opportunity for lower-income Blacks to substitute/switch firms
and thereby seek lower-cost loans.
A factor motivating such a substitution is that banks offer deposit advances to customers, which
are typically structured as short-term loans but without a predetermined repayment date. This product
is a potentially much less costly substitute for payday loans. Our exploratory investigation seeks to
determine whether there is a substitution of Black-owned bank offices1 for payday loan stores while
controlling for a variety of demographic and economic characteristics in geographical locations where
both types of financial firms simultaneously operate.2 The inclusion of such controls better enables us
to isolate the association between Black banks and payday stores. Importantly, we do find (consistent
with the hypothesized substitution process described) that there are fewer payday loan stores in
counties where there are more Black bank offices.
An issue that immediately arises when focusing on Black-owned banks is exactly how to distinguish
these institutions from other depository institutions. In this regard, Section 308 of FIRREA defines a
“Black-owned bank” as a depository institution where "Black Americans" own 51 percent or more of
the stock. In addition to institutions that meet the ownership test, institutions are “Black-owned
banks” if a majority of the Board of Directors is Black and the community that the institution serves is
predominantly Black. Institutions not already identified as Black-owned depository institutions can
request such a designation by certifying that they meet the above criteria.
In addition to examining whether there is a substitution of Black-owned bank offices for payday
lending stores, we also test whether there is a substitution of non-Black-owned bank offices for
payday lending stores. Lastly, we also investigate whether there is a substitution of non-Black-owned
bank offices for Black-owned bank offices.
The remainder of our exploratory study proceeds as follows. In section 2, a brief review of related
literature is provided. This is followed by an overview of both the payday lending industry and the
Black banking sector in which we emphasize two somewhat unique issues that arise when studying
these types of financial firms. Section 3 presents and discusses our approach to empirically analyzing
the relationship between the number of Black bank offices and the number of payday loan stores
operating in the same geographical locations in the U.S. In Section 4, our empirical results are
presented and discussed. Section 5 presents the estimation results for determining whether there is a
substitution of non-Black-owned bank offices for payday lending stores as well as whether there is a
substitution of non-Black offices for Black bank offices. Section 6 provides conclusions, limitations,
and suggestions for future research.

RELATED LITERATURE
The criteria for receiving a payday loan are evidence of both employment and a checking account. The
maturity of payday loans is most often two weeks, which is intended to coincide with a common pay
cycle and set so that a borrower can repay upon receipt of the next paycheck. At the time a loan is
originated, the borrower writes a postdated personal check or electronic authorization to debit the
borrower's checking account for the loan amount plus the lending fee to the payday lender. When the
loan is due, the payday lender can deposit the personal check or initiate the electronic withdrawal.
__________________________________________________

We use the terms “Black banks” and “Black bank offices” rather the “Black-owned banks” and Black-owned bank offices,”
respectively, throughout the remaining sections of this study. We do so simply because this terminology is consistent with
previous related literature (see, e.g., Baradaran, 2017).
2 Interestingly, solely Black-owned banks flourished in the 1950s and 1960s; however, over the 2001-2018 period, the number
of exclusively Black-owned financial institutions declined over 50%, leaving only 21 Black-owned banks in the United States.
Although there are a moderate number of branch banks for each of these institutions, it also is noteworthy that they all are
comparatively small, with none managing even $1 billion.
1
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Numerous studies of payday lenders focus on the demographics of their customer base (Graves,
2003; Stegman and Faris, 2003; Gallmeyer and Roberts, 2009; Bhutta, 2014; Barth et al., 2015) and the
effect of regulations on their locational decisions (Morgan and Strain, 2008; Zinman, 2010; Barth et al.,
2016; Bhutta et al., 2016). A general conclusion of these studies is that payday lenders tend to
concentrate in low‐income areas having a relatively high percentage of Black residents. Accordingly,
in the present study, the percentage of the population that is Black is included as a control variable.
Not surprisingly, it is found that states with more lenient regulations on payday lenders tend to have
a higher concentration of such stores. We, therefore, include variables to control for the regulatory
environment of the counties used in our analysis.
A serious challenge that confronts one studying the payday lending industry is that there is
currently no available dataset that identifies only licensed payday lenders throughout the country.
Accordingly, some studies (Stegman and Faris, 2003; Burkey and Simkins, 2004; Johnson, 2005; Graves,
2005; Xu, 2016) consider only a few states, a procedure that appears to facilitate identifying payday
lenders more easily. In other cases, studies rely on two North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) codes to capture payday loan firms operating across the country. In addition to payday
lenders, however, these codes include other types of lending firms. Specifically, the codes include
firms primarily engaged in making unsecured cash loans to consumers and firms that facilitate credit
intermediation, including check cashing services and money-order issuance services.3 Although
researchers using the NAICS codes try to screen out non-payday loan firms, the resulting effort is
problematic, and the firms identified generally overstate the total presence of payday stores (Barth et
al., 2016). We, therefore, rely on data that were obtained directly from the appropriate state regulatory
authorities, following Barth et al. (2016). Importantly, this dataset contains only payday loan stores,
excluding firms that simply provide cash checking services. Another uniqueness of the dataset is it also
contains information on the various restrictions that states imposed on payday lenders, which will be
used in our empirical analysis.

DATA AND MODEL
Figure 1 shows the location of Black bank offices and payday loan stores throughout the U.S. The bank
office data are collected from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the payday loan
stores data rely upon the data used by Barth et al. (2016). Their unique dataset is obtained directly
from the state regulatory authorities through a combination of phone requests, written requests, and
FOIA requests. As illustrated, there are (1) states with both types of financial firms, (2) states with only
one or the other type of firm, and (3) states with neither type of firm. Payday loan stores are located
in 35 states, while Black bank offices are located in 22 states and Washington, D.C. Both types of firms
are located in 15 states. Lastly, there are seven states with neither type of firm. The focus of our
examination is on counties within the 15 states having both types of firms.

__________________________________________________

The codes are 522291 (consumer lending) and 522390 (other activities related to credit intermediation). Barth et al. (2015)
follow Bhutta (2014) and therefore rely on the same two NAICS codes.
3
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The initial model4 that is used for examining whether Black bank offices substitute for payday loan
stores is, as follows:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 + ∑14
𝑖𝑖=2 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀1

(1)

where Payday Stores is the number of payday loan stores per 10,000 population in each county, Black
Bank Offices is the number of Black bank offices per 10,000 population in each county, Controls are
the 13 control variables that are described in Table 1, ε is the stochastic error term, c denotes a county,
and i denotes a control variable. If for Blacks, Black bank offices and payday loan stores are regarded
as substitutes, we would expect that the coefficient on Black Bank Offices, β1, will be significantly
negative.
Table 1 provides the variables used in our analysis, their definitions, and data sources.5

__________________________________________________

We use the phrase “initial model” because, in Section 5, we perform additional tests that allow us to examine whether
similar substitutions exist between payday loan stores and non-Black bank offices as well as between Black bank offices and
non-Black bank offices.
5 A Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables is available upon request.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable
Definition
Black
Percent Black Population
Asian
Percent Asian Population
Hispanic
Percent Hispanic Population
Age<15
Percent Population under Age 15
Age>65
Percent Population over Age 65
Percent Population Age 25 and Older with a High
HSD
School Diploma or Higher
Rural Pop
Percent Population Residing in Rural Areas
Female Pop
Percent Population Female
Payday Stores Number of Payday Lenders per 10,000 Population
Max Loan
Dummy Variable Maximum Dollar Loan Amount
14-day-APR
Dummy Variable APR for a Fourteen-day $100 Loan
Max OST
Maximum Number of Outstanding Loans
Max NRO
Maximum Number of Rollovers or Renewals
UR
Black Bank
Offices

Unemployment Rate (Percent)
Number of Black-owned MDI Offices per 10,000
Population

Source

U.S. Census Bureau

Barth, Hilliard, Jahera, and
Sun (2016)
U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation

Note: All variables are for the year 2015. Also, we exclude the percent White population because all four categories total 100
percent and our focus is on controlling for the different minority populations. Thus, the percent White population is captured
by the constant term in the regressions that are estimated below.

The summary statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2. As shown, there are far more
payday loan stores than there are Black bank offices. It is also shown that in the counties located within
the 15 states having both of these types of financial firms, the percentage of the minority population
that is Black is the highest at 7.3 percent, followed by Hispanics at 5.7 percent, and Asians at 0.8
percent, respectively. The other control variables exhibit substantial variation, as indicated by the
differences between the minimum and maximum values.

__________________________________________________
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Table 2. Summary Statistics (N=1,457 Counties)
Main Variables
Payday Stores (# per 10,000)
Black Bank Offices
(# per 10,000)
Blacks (%)

Mean Std. Dev. Min
1.01
1.12
0

Max
6.68

0.002

0.03

0

1.15

7.31

10.09

0

54.92

Asians (%)

0.78

1.75

0

26.79

Hispanics (%)

5.69

9.36

0

59.86

Age<15 (%)

18.75

2.77

6.50

29.50

Age>65 (%)

17.06

4.43

6.80

50.90

HSD (%)

83.38

7.00

46.20 97.70

UR (%)

5.85

1.97

2.00

24.50

Rural Pop (%)

58.33

31.94

0.00

100

Female Pop (%)

50.00

2.60

31.47

59.42

Poverty (%)

17.44

6.57

3.30

44.90

MHHI (Ln $)

10.68

0.25

9.87

11.72

Max Loan (0,1)

0.38

0.49

0

1

14-day-APR (0, 1)

0.55

0.50

0

1

Max OST (#)

2.49

1.63

0

6

Max NRO (#)

1.00

2.13

0

6

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The results from estimating the model in equation (1) are reported in Table 3. The most important
result is that Black bank offices do indeed substitute for payday loan stores. The coefficient on the
number of Black bank offices is negative and highly statistically significant. A one standard deviation
increase in the number of Black offices per 10,000 persons is associated with a decline of 0.06 per
10,000 persons in the number of payday loan stores. The results also indicate that there is a
significantly positive relationship between the number of payday lender stores and the percent of the
population that is African American, whereas the relationships between the number of payday lender
stores and the percent of the population that is either Asian or Hispanic are significantly negative. Also,
the findings indicate that less restrictive regulations governing the operations of payday lenders,
measured by 14-day-APR, Max OST, and Max NRO, are all positively and statistically associated with
more such stores. Furthermore, the number of payday loan stores is found to be statistically negatively
associated with higher percentages of the population that have high school degrees but significantly
positively associated with higher unemployment rates. Lastly, fewer payday lenders are associated
with a higher percentage population over age 65, a higher percentage of the population residing in
rural areas, and a lower percentage population that is female.

__________________________________________________
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Table 3. Empirical Results
Payday Stores
Intercept
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Age<15
Age>65
HSD
UR
Rural Pop
Female Pop
Max Loan
14-day-APR
Max OST
Max NRO
Black Bank Offices
N = 1,457 counties

Robust
Coefficient
Std. Err.
2.263***
0.904
0.007*
0.004
-0.067***
0.015
-0.030***
0.004
0.016
0.014
-0.016**
0.008
-0.053***
0.006
0.045***
0.016
-0.009***
0.001
0.061***
0.013
-0.020
0.081
0.247***
0.076
0.117***
0.026
0.084***
0.014
-1.923***
0.430
2
Adjusted R = 0.30

t-value
p-value
2.81
0.005
1.79
0.073
-4.55
0.000
-7.06
0.000
1.16
0.248
-2.08
0.038
-9.01
0.000
2.77
0.006
-8.69
0.000
4.85
0.000
-0.24
0.807
3.24
0.001
4.59
0.000
5.87
0.000
-4.48
0.000
F = 38.30

Note: The dependent variable is Payday Stores, the number of payday lender stores per 10,000 population. All
variables are defined in Table 1. The t-values and p-values are based on robust standard errors. Symbols ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Also, we exclude the percent White
population because all four categories total 100 percent and our focus is on controlling for the different minority
populations. Thus, the percent White population is captured by the constant term.

ADDITIONAL TESTS
As discussed, our empirical results are consistent with the perspective that payday lending stores and
Black bank offices are substitutes. However, two additional issues merit further consideration. The
first issue is whether the same substitution exists between payday lending stores and non-Black bank
offices, whereas the second issue is whether there is a substitution effect between Black bank offices
and non-Black bank offices. To examine these issues, we estimate two additional regression equations.
Equation (2) addresses the first issue, whereas Equation (3) addresses the second. The control
variables are the same in these two models as in Equation (1).

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 + ∑14
𝑖𝑖=2 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2 (2)

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 + ∑10
𝑖𝑖=2 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀3

(3)

The empirical results from estimating Equation (2) are reported in Table 4. As may be seen, the
coefficient of Non-Black Bank Offices enters with a negative sign but is not significantly different from
zero. This indicates that payday lending stores and non-Black bank offices are neither substitutes nor
complements. The results for the control variables are generally consistent with those reported in
Table 3.

__________________________________________________
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Table 4. Empirical Results
Payday Stores
Intercept
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Age<15
Age>65
HSD
UR
Rural Pop
Female Pop
Max Loan
14-day-APR
Max OST
Max NRO
Non-Black Bank Offices
N = 2,401 counties

Robust
Coefficient
Std. Err.
2.548***
0.313
0.013***
0.004
-0.070***
0.012
-0.017***
0.003
-0.018**
0.009
-0.013**
0.006
-0.051***
0.004
0.032**
0.013
-0.008***
0.001
0.065***
0.010
-0.202***
0.037
0.328***
0.036
0.054***
0.014
0.080***
0.010
-0.001
0.007
2
Adjusted R = 0.30

t-value
p-value
4.16
0.000
3.45
0.001
-5.70
0.000
-6.09
0.000
-2.07
0.039
-2.20
0.028
-12.44
0.000
2.40
0.017
-9.76
0.000
6.64
0.000
-5.44
0.000
9.15
0.000
3.81
0.000
7.82
0.000
-0.22
0.827
F = 60.37

Note: The dependent variable is Payday Stores, the number of payday lender stores per 10,000 population. The tvalues and p-values are based on robust standard errors. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

As far as whether Black bank offices and non-Black bank offices are substitutes or not, the results
are reported in Table 5. For this estimation, the results indicate there is no significant relationship
between the two variables. Indeed, only two of the explanatory variables are statistically significant,
the variables Black and Female Pop.

__________________________________________________
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Table 5. Empirical Results
Black Bank Offices
Intercept
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Age<15
Age>65
HSD
UR
Rural Pop
Female Pop
Non-Black Bank Offices
N = 3,046 counties

Robust
Coefficient
Std. Err.
-0.0472
0.0294
0.0005*
0.0003
0.0000
0.0001
0.0002
0.0001
-0.0001
0.0002
-0.0001
0.0008
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
0.0005**
0.0002
-0.0000
0.0001
2
Adjusted R = 0.03

t-value
-1.61
1.94
0.33
1.62
-0.79
-0.82
1.47
0.63
0.57
2.21
-0.28

p-value
0.108
0.052
0.739
0.106
0.430
0.412
0.141
0.528
0.569
0.027
0.778
F = 3.38

Note: The dependent variable is Black Bank Offices, the number of Black bank offices per 10,000 population. The tvalues and p-values are based on robust standard errors. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS
Some consider payday lenders to be controversial financial firms. Aside from a degree of preference
for these types of firms over traditional banks that may exist on the part of certain minorities
(Baradaran, 2017), the controversy is largely due to the extraordinarily higher interest rates payday
lenders charge on loans to their customers. Adding to this controversy is the fact that they are found
to operate in locations with relatively high percentages of Blacks and tend to cater to low-income
Blacks, as our empirical results indicate. In this exploratory study, we investigate empirically whether,
in those locations where both payday loan stores and Black bank offices operate, there is evidence of
a substitution effect. That is, Blacks can substitute Black banks for payday lenders because they would
be in a more favorable position to benefit by obtaining lower-cost loans. Specifically, we analyze
whether there is a significantly negative relationship between the numbers of payday loan stores and
Black bank offices in counties in states where both types of firms operate simultaneously. Our
empirical estimation results indicate that there is indeed such a statistically significant negative
relationship, which is consistent with the hypothesized substitution of Black bank offices for payday
loan stores.
In addition, we perform two additional tests to determine whether the same type of substitution
exists between payday lending stores and non-Black bank offices and whether there is a substitution
effect between Black bank offices and non-Black bank offices. In both of these cases, we find there is
no such substitution effect. Indeed, there is therefore only evidence that such an effect exists between
payday lending stores and Black bank offices.
A limitation of our study is that we do not have access to individual loan data over time for both
payday lenders and Black banks to be able to perform a panel data analysis. This prevents one from
determining more definitively whether Blacks do switch from payday loan stores to Black bank offices
in those counties where both offer their services as well as address potential endogeneity issues. To
the extent possible, future research should pursue such an analysis. Despite this limitation, it is
nevertheless pertinent to have found that there is a statistically inverse relationship between payday
__________________________________________________
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loan stores and Black bank offices in counties where there is a significantly positive association
between payday loan stores and the percentage of the population that is Black.

__________________________________________________
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